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Smith: Smith: Wrestling with the Effects of Title IX:

Wrestling With the Effects of Title IX: Is It
Time To Adopt New Measures of

Compliance for University
Athletic Programs?
Chalenorv. University of North Dakota'
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, following the Department of
Education's policy interpretation and other circuit courts of appeals, held that the
University of North Dakota did not violate the men's wrestling team members'
and recruits' rights under Title IX' when it eliminated the men's varsity wrestling
program.3 The circuit courts of appeals outside the Eighth Circuit had held that
eliminating an athletic program of an over-represented gender to make athletic
opportunities between genders substantially proportionate was a satisfactory
means of compliance with Title IX. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed these holdings in developing its opinion. This Note examines how
Title IX compliance can be achieved in the context of athletic opportunities in
universities and other educational institutions that receive federal financial
support. It also looks at how the goals of Title IX could be more efficiently
achieved by revising the policy interpretations that give guidance for complying
with the statute.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Eric Chalenor, Brady Flatten, Chad Lorenson, and Mike Schuster were
members or recruits of the men's wrestling team at the University of North
Dakota.4 On May 7, 1998, the university's Intercollegiate Athletic Committee
reported that, in order to comply with Governor Edward Schafer's request for an
overall budget reduction, $95,000 needed to be cut from the university's athletic
budget.' As a result of this report, the Committee voted to eliminate the men's
wrestling program.6 Eliminating the men's wrestling program saved the
university $49,000.'

I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1050.
Id.
Id. at 1042-43.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id.
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In April 1995, prior to the elimination of the wrestling team, the university
issued its "Final Gender Equity in Athletics Report."8 The goal of the report was
to increase female participation in athletics and reduce the disparity of athletic
participation between men and women.9 No changes to men's athletic programs
were recommended by the report, but it did recommend the addition of three
women's sports." Women's golf was to be added to the athletic program in
1995, and women's tennis and soccer were to be added in 1997 and 1999,
respectively." Although not necessitated by the report, the Committee voted to
eliminate the men's wrestling program on May 29, 1998.12
Subsequently, Chalenor, Flatten, Lorenson, and Schuster filed suit against
the university for a violation of their rights under Title IX. 3 The university
moved for summary judgment on the grounds that "equalizing athletic
opportunities for men and women does not violate Title IX."' 4 The District

Court for the District of North Dakota granted summary judgment in favor of the
university. 5 On appeal, the members and recruits argued that the elimination of
the men's wrestling program was a "clear example of sex discrimination which
Title IX explicitly forbids."' 6 The university countered that due to the budget
contraction, allowing men to receive a disproportionate amount of the athletic
budget would have discriminated against women.' 7 The team members and
recruits then claimed that concerns about the budget were not a factor in the
decision to eliminate the wrestling program, because a private donor had offered
to fund the program. 8
In analyzing Title IX in the context of athletic opportunities, the district
court looked to a regulation supplied by the Department of Health and Human
Services and the Department of Education.' This regulation provided that a
recipient of federal financial support, which operates or sponsors intercollegiate
athletic programs, "shall provide equal athletic opportunitfies]for members of
both sexes. '2' The regulation set out three standards, one of which must be met
in order to comply with Title IX. ' The first standard is "[w]hether
intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are
8. Id. at 1044.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.at 1043.
14. Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1156 (D.N.D. 2000), af'd,
291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002).
15. Chalenor,291 F.3d at 1043.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1045.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments."22 The second standard for Title IX compliance is: "[w]here the
members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate
athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest
and abilities of the members of that sex." 3 The third standard is:
[w]here the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can
be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that
sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
24
program.
The Department of Education subsequently issued a clarification to the
regulation, which stated that "an institution can choose which part of the test it
plans to meet,"2 5 and that choosing to eliminate or cap teams was a way of
complying with the standards.26 The court held that the policy interpretation
given to the regulation was reasonable and controlling deference should be
27
given to it.
The members and recruits argued that budget concerns were not a reason
for eliminating the wrestling program." They claimed that the availability of
outside private funding would have allowed the university to eliminate its
funding of the men's wrestling program without eliminating the entire program.29
The court held, however, that a public university cannot "avoid its legal
obligations by substituting funds from private sources for funds from tax
revenues," 30 reiterating the district court's holding that the availability of outside
funding cannot be used as a defense for providing disproportionate athletic
opportunities in violation of Title IX.3 Therefore, the claim that budgetary
concerns were not involved in the decision made by the university was deemed
to be without merit.3

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1046.
Id.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court of appeals held that controlling deference was owed to the
Department of Education's policy interpretation of Title IX regulations.33 The
university was not required to show that it had not already met required
accommodations before pursuing gender proportionality in athletics and that the
alleged availability of outside private funding did not render elimination of the
men's wrestling program discriminatory under Title IX."

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
According to its primary sponsor, Senator Birch Bayh, Title IX was enacted
in 1972 with the hope of providing American women with "something that is
rightfully theirs-an equal chance to attend the schools of their choice, to
develop skills they want, and to apply those skills with the knowledge that they
will have a fair chance to secure the jobs of their choice with equal pay for equal
work."35 Title IX prohibits any person, on the basis of sex, from being excluded
from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to
discrimination "under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."36 Educational programs and activities include colleges,
universities and other postsecondary institutions.37 However, intercollegiate
athletics were not explicitly addressed by Title IX.38
The Department of Education, the agency in charge of implementing Title
IX, drafted a regulation that addressed discrimination in intercollegiate
athletics.3 9 The regulation stated that "[n]o person [could], on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied benefits of, be treated differently
from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient" of federal
financial support.4" The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare also
promulgated regulations in 1975 that included provisions specifically for
athletics.41 These regulation stayed in effect until 1984, when the "Supreme
Court radically altered the contemporary reading of Title IX."42

33. Id.at 1046-47.
34. Id.at 1048.
35. Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1159 (D.N.D. 2000), aff'd,
291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).
36. 20 U.S.C. § 168 1(a) (2000).
37. 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A) (2000).
38. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Cohen I"), aff'd in
part & rev 'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1stCir. 1996).
39. Chalenor, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1156.
40. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2002).
41. Cohen 1,991 F.2d at 893.
42. Id.at 894.
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In Grove City College v. Bell,43 the Court held that Title IX was "programspecific" and therefore only applied to areas of the university that actually
received federal financial funds." Few athletic departments actually receive
federal financial funds directly.45 Therefore, the Court's holding placed
collegiate athletic programs beyond the reach of Title IX. However, Congress
quickly reacted to the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College.46
Congress, by passing the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, re-instituted an
industry wide application of Title IX, which placed collegiate athletic programs
back within the grasp of the statute.47 Ten factors were enunciated to be
analyzed in determining whether a school had provided equal opportunities for
men and women. 4' These factors were:
(1) [w]hether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both
sexes; (2) [t]he provision of equipment and supplies; (3) [s]cheduling
of games and practice times; (4) [t]ravel and per diem allowance; (5)
[o]pportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring; (6)
[a]ssignment and compensation of coaches and tutors; (7) [p]rovision
of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities; (8) [p]rovision of
medical and training facilities and services; (9) [p]rovision of housing
and dining facilities and services; (10) [p]ublicity."
The statutory language of Title IX "sketches wide policy lines, leaving the
details to regulating agencies." 5 Due to the filing of over 100 discrimination
complaints involving violations of Title IX by college and university athletic
programs in the three years following the initial issue of the regulation, the
Department of Education promulgated a policy interpretation in the hopes of
The policy
encouraging self-policing and eliminating complaints.5
whether
a college
order
to
assess
interpretation established three benchmarks in
52
or university's athletic program is in compliance with Title IX, one of which
must be met in order to comply with the statute.53

43. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 268 (7th Cir. 1994).
49. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2002).
50. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Cohen I"), aff'd in
part & rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996).
51. Id. at 896.
52. Id. at 897.
53. Id.
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The first benchmark for effectively accommodating the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes and thus complying with Title IX deals with
"[w]hether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female
students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments." 4 This first benchmark is considered to be a "safe harbor" for
colleges and universities "that have distributed athletic opportunities in numbers
'substantially proportionate' to the gender composition of their student bodies.""
In the case of Cohen v. Brown University, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit drew an important line for determining what is "substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollment." 6 In Cohen, Brown University,
which was experiencing financial difficulty, eliminated women's volleyball,
women's gymnastics, men's golf, and men's water polo from its varsity athletic
roster." Eliminating the women's varsity sports would have saved the university
$62,028, while eliminating the men's varsity sports would have saved the
university only $15,795." s After announcement of the elimination of the
programs, members of the women's volleyball and gymnastics teams brought
suit against the university for violation of Title IX. 9 The female members
argued that the violation occurred because of the university's decision to
"devalue the two women's programs without first making sufficient reductions
in men's activities or, in the alternative, adding other women's teams to
compensate for the loss. ''6 ° Brown University, on the other hand, argued that
under the Department of Education's policy interpretation, colleges and
universities should be able to comply with Title IX by providing athletic
opportunities that were substantially proportionate to the comparative levels of
interest of each sex. 6'
The court disagreed with Brown University. 62 Had it agreed with Brown
University's argument that women are less interested in sports than men, the
court stated that it would have been ignoring the "fact that Title IX was enacted
that results from stereotyped notions of
in order to remedy discrimination
63
women's interests and abilities.
The Cohen court also addressed the means by which a college or university
can satisfy the first benchmark, thereby coming into compliance with Title IX.
An institution can create gender parity in its athletic program by adding and

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. at 897.
Id.
Id. at 892.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 899.
Id.

63. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Cohen II").
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upgrading teams for the underrepresented gender." However, during times in
which there are budgetary concerns for an athletic program, adding and
upgrading teams may not be feasible. Therefore, the court stated that a college
or university can comply with the first benchmark by subtracting and
downgrading teams, thereby "reducing opportunities for the overrepresented
gender while keeping opportunities stable for the underrepresented gender."65
In fact, every court that has addressed the issue has held that a college or
university can bring itself into compliance with Title IX by increasing
opportunities for the underrepresented gender or by decreasing athletic
opportunities for the overrepresented gender.66 "If a university wishes to comply
with Title IX by leveling down programs instead of ratcheting them up... Title
67
IX is not offended.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dealt with the issue of
providing opportunities that were "substantially proportionate" in a case
regarding the elimination of a men's swimming program.68 In Kelley v. Board
of Trustees, the University of Illinois, confronted with a large budget deficit,
decided to eliminate the men's swimming program. 69 The university, however,
elected not to eliminate the women's swimming program.7 ' The court stated that
not eliminating the women's program was extremely prudent, because "[t]he
percentage of women involved in intercollegiate athletics [was] substantially
lower than the percentage of women enrolled at the school."''1 Because the
presence of men's programs would be more than substantially proportionate to
the undergraduate enrollment of men, even after the men's swimming program
was eliminated, the court held that the university could eliminate the program
without violating Title Ix. The court went on to state that "if the percentage
of student-athletes of a particular sex is substantially proportionate to the
percentage of students of that sex in the general student population, the athletic
interests of that sex are presumed to have been accommodated. 73 The members
of the men's swimming team also argued that the substantial proportionality
benchmark, contained in the Department of Education's policy interpretation,
"establishes a gender-based quota system," which they alleged was contrary to
the mandates of Title IX. 74 The court held that the policy does not require

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Cohen 1, 991 F.2d at 898 n.15.
Id.
Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 769-70 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 770.
Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 271.
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statistical balancing." Rather, if a school achieves the statistical balance, the
policy interpretation creates a presumption that the school is in compliance with
76
Title IX.
Questions still remain as to what ratio of athletic opportunity compared to
enrollment of a specific gender is considered substantially proportionate. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed this issue in Roberts v.
Colorado State Board ofAgriculture." In Roberts, members of the women's
fast-pitch softball team sued Colorado State University for a Title IX violation
for eliminating the softball program."8 The university maintained that it was not
in violation of Title IX.79 The court of appeals agreed with the district court
opinion that the university did not have substantial proportionality between
athletic participation and undergraduate enrollment.8" In reviewing statistical
data, the district court found that, following the termination of the women's fastpitch softball program, "the disparity between enrollment and athletic
participation for women at CSU [was] 10.5%."8I The court of appeals,
concurring with the district court, held that a 10.5 percent disparity "between
female athletic participation and female undergraduate enrollment is not
substantially proportionate," and, therefore, the elimination of the program was
a violation of Title IX.82
While the court in Roberts held that a 10.5 percent disparity did not
constitute a substantially proportionate level of athletic participation to
undergraduate enrollment, there is not a bright line rule that can be used to
determine what ratio is or is not substantially proportionate."3 Title IX
compliance investigators have been instructed by the Office of Civil Rights that
"there is no set ratio that constitutes 'substantially proportionate' or that, when
'
not met, results in a disparity or a violation."84
The second benchmark for complying with Title IX looks to "[w]here the
members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate
athletes, whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest
and abilities of the members of that sex."85 This benchmark sets out how a
college or university can be in compliance with Title IX without proportionality

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Roberts v. Colo.State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 826.
79. Id. at 827.
80. Id. at 829-30.
81. Id. at 829.
82. Id. at 830.
83. Id. at 829.
84. Id. at 829-30.
85. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,898 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Cohen I"), aff'din
part & rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
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between athletic opportunities and gender enrollment.8 6 "So long as a university
is continually expanding athletic opportunities in an ongoing effort to meet the
needs of the underrepresented gender, and persists in this approach as interest
and ability levels in its student body and secondary feeder schools rise,
87
benchmark two is satisfied.
The third benchmark for determining whether a intercollegiate athletic
program is in compliance with Title IX is:
[w]here the members of one sex are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing
practice of program expansion such as that cited above, whether it can
be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of that
sex have 8been fully and effectively accommodated by the present
8
program.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this benchmark in Roberts. The
university stated that it was required to accommodate women only to the extent
that it accommodated men, and because the women's softball program was
eliminated along with men's baseball program, the plaintiffs should not be
allowed to complain. 89 The court held that the university did not meet the high
standard set by the third benchmark."0 The benchmark requires full and effective
accommodation.91 If the statistically underrepresented gender has sufficient
interest and ability among its members, and that interest is not satisfied by the
existing programs, then the college or university necessarily fails to satisfy the
third benchmark for complying with Title IX.92
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The plaintiffs originally filed their complaint against the University ofNorth
Dakota in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. 93 In
the complaint, the athletes alleged that the university violated Title IX when it
"eliminated the male varsity wrestling program in order to attain proportionality
between the gender composition of the student body."'94 The University of North
Dakota responded by arguing that it eliminated the men's varsity wrestling
86. Id.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
291 F.3d

Id.
Id.
Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 831-32.
Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1043 (8th Cir. 2002).
Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1155 (D.N.D. 2000), aff'd,
1042 (8th Cir. 2002).
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program in order to attain gender equity.95 The university further argued that
equalizing athletic opportunities for men and women does not violate Title IX
and that it was entitled to a grant of summary judgment based on the facts of the
case.96 The athletes contended that summary judgment was inappropriate
because there was a material issue of fact as to the university's actual motivation
for eliminating the wrestling program. 97 The district court disagreed with the
athletes and granted summary judgment in favor of the university.9
In addressing the members' first complaint, that the university eliminated
the wrestling program "in order to attain proportionality between the gender
composition of the student body," the court stated that achieving proportionality
with student body gender composition is one of three methods of compliance
with Title IX." The court looked to Department of Health, Education and
Welfare policy interpretation in order to establish that the university had
effectively accommodated the interests of both its male and female students.' 0
The policy set out three benchmarks for determining whether an institution
has complied with Title IX.' °' Of these three benchmarks, an institution must
meet one in order to comply with Title IX." 2 The first benchmark is the least
stringent and looks at "[w]hether intercollegiate level participation opportunities
for male and female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate
to their respective enrollments."'0 3 Because the Eighth Circuit had not yet
addressed this issue, the court looked to other circuits.'0 4 In a similar case, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that a university, which eliminated the
men's swimming program and was primarily motivated by budget concerns, did
not violate Title IX because after eliminating the program, "men's participation
in athletics was more than substantially proportionate to their presence within the
student body."'0 5
In the instant case, the members were not able to show that by eliminating
the men's wrestling program, men had now become underrepresented in the
university's athletic program.'0 6 The university was able to show that, even with
the elimination of the men's wrestling program, men were still substantially
overrepresented in athletics at the university. 0 7 In 1999-2000, one year after the
elimination of the men's wrestling program, men still represented sixty-four
95. Id. at 1156.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1156-57.
100. Id.at 1157.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (discussing Kelley v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 269-70 (7th Cir. 1994)).
106. Id. at 1158.
107. Id.
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percent of the athletes in the athletic program, while only comprising fifty-one
percent of the undergraduates enrolled at the university. "8 Recruiting expenses
for men constituted seventy-nine percent of the recruiting budget while athletic
related financial aid to men represented sixty-eight percent of that budget." 9
Therefore, the court held that there was no basis for a claim of a violation of0
Title IX by the university for eliminating the men's varsity wrestling program."
The athletes attempted to raise a material issue of fact as to the university
of North Dakota's motivation for eliminating the wrestling program."' They
stated that the availability of outside funding to the wrestling program cast doubt
on the university's motivation in eliminating the program."' A donor, Dan
Sampson, stated that he would cover "shortfalls in allocation to the program by
[the university].""' 3 However, he never stated how much funding he would
provide or how long his funding would continue.' ' The court concluded that the
availability of outside funding had no bearing on the analysis of the case. "5 Title
IX is an important reason why a "university would choose to eliminate an
athletic program, notwithstanding the potential for outside funding."" 6 The
court stated that it was conceivable that a university could violate Title IX by
accepting outside funding, which would lead to more than substantially
proportionate athletic opportunities to one gender." 7 The court wrote that "it is
not clear that 'outside funding' is a defense to a university which provides more
than substantially proportionate athletic opportunity to one gender in violation
of Title IX,"" 8 and that it "believes that 'outside funding' is not and should not
be such a defense."'"19
The athletes subsequently appealed the grant of summaryjudgment in favor
of the university to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The athletes'
appeal centered around four claims of error by the trial court. The first claim on
appeal was that the trial court erred in granting substantial deference to the
agency's interpretation of its own regulation. 20 The university argued that it
relied on the Department of Education's policy interpretation, clarification
memorandum, and a transmittal letter in determining that the elimination of the
men's wrestling program was not a violation of Title IX, but was actually an
108. Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1044 (8th Cir. 2002).
109. Id.
110. Chalenor, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1158.
111. Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1044.
112. Id.
113. Id.at 1048.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Chalenorv.Univ. of N.D., 142 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1158 (D.N.D.2000),aff'd,
291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002).
117. Id.
118. Id.at 1159.

119. Id.
120. Chalenor, 291 F.3d at 1046.
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action to bring the university in compliance with Title IX. 12' Therefore, the
Department of Education's interpretation of its own regulations, the university
22
argued, was entitled to substantial deference. 1
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that although substantial
deference is not due to the Department of Education's interpretations,
clarification memorandums, and transmittal letter, these interpretations and
documents still have the "power to persuade."' 23 It further held that if the
Department's regulation is ambiguous, then deference must be given to the
agency's interpretation of the regulation.' 24 According to the court, since the
Department's policy interpretation was "a reasonable and considered
25
interpretation of the regulation," then it was due controlling deference.
The athletes next claimed that even if the Department of Education's policy
interpretation was entitled to deference, the university failed to establish that it
was required to engage in gender balancing. 26 They further claimed that there
were two other benchmarks for complying with Title IX that the university could
have elected to meet and that the university failed to show that it had not already
complied with either of the other two benchmarks. 27 The court stated that the
university never contended that gender proportionality was required.12 The
university's position, which according to the court was a correct position, was
that gender proportionality was permissible and was relevant
in determining
12 9
whether an institution was in compliance with Title IX.
Third, the athletes alleged that the budgetary issues claimed by the
university as the reason for eliminating the men's wrestling program were nonexistent and were used to disguise the university's "true discriminatory
motive."' 30 The athletes stated that outside funding for the wrestling program
was available and that the university could have eliminated their funding of the
program without eliminating the entire men's wrestling program." ' They further
stated that since they believed that budgetary constraints were not a factor in the
decision making process of the university, their situation was distinguished from
case law in other circuits that held that a university can comply with Title IX by
limiting athletic opportunities for men only.3 2 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the athletes' arguments were without merit and that their

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1047 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1048.
Id.
Id.
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case, like those from other circuits, involved budgetary issues.33 The court
stated that there were several problems with the plaintiffs' argument, but the
most important problem dealt with "substituting funds from private sources for
funds from tax revenues."' 34 The court of appeals agreed with the district court's
statement that "outside funding is not a defense for 'a university which provides
more than substantially35 proportionate athletic opportunity to one gender in
violation of Title IX."
The athletes' final contention on appeal was that Chief Judge Webb should
have been disqualified from hearing the case because of a "major conflict of
interest," which the athletes believed affected their right to a "fair and impartial
hearing. '136 Chief Judge Webb was a graduate of the University of North
Dakota and a financial contributor to the university. 137 The court held that the
athletes' contentions regarding the judge were immaterial, and that there were
no contentions or facts stated that showed the judge had a specific or particular
interest in the wrestling program. 3 Therefore, there was no reasonable basis for
questioning the judge's impartiality.' 39
V. COMMENT

Males have had an "enormous head start" over females in acquiring athletic
resources. 4 Since its inception in 1972, Title IX has made giant strides to cure
this head start and bring athletic opportunities for women to a level more on par
with the opportunities that men receive. Title IX's effects have reached beyond
the levels of intercollegiate athletics and into the realm of professional athletics.
Professional women's basketball, soccer, and softball leagues now exist. Over
90,000 people packed the Rose Bowl in Pasadena, California, to watch the finals
of the women's soccer World Cup in 1999.'' Many, if not almost all, of these
opportunities for women would never have been available if Title IX had not
have been enacted.
In Chalenor,the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit followed precedent
set in other circuits in concluding that the University of North Dakota did not
violate Title IX by eliminating its men's varsity wrestling program. 42 The court
followed Department of Education policy interpretations when it decided that
eliminating a men's athletic program was a satisfactory means of achieving the
first standard for compliance with Title IX by providing "equal athletic
133. Id.
134. Id.

135. Id. (quoting Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1159 (D.N.D.
2000), aff'd, 291 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2002)).

136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 1049.
Id.
Id. at 1049-50.
Id.

140. Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 1999).
141. Gary Davidson, U.S. Wins the World Cup in Shootout, SOCCERTIMES, July 10,
1999, availableat http://www.soccertimes.com/worldcup/1999/games/J ul0.htm.
142. Chalenor,291 F.3d at 1049.
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Since the enactment of Title IX,over 170 wrestling programs, eighty men's
tennis teams, seventy men's gymnastics teams, and forty-five men's track teams
have been eliminated from intercollegiate athletic programs.'" Those
eliminations alone rid men of over 80,000 positions in varsity athletic
programs. 4 If an institution chooses to meet the first standard of Title IX
compliance, it will be required to provide athletic opportunities that are
substantially proportionate to each gender's undergraduate enrollment."
Many opponents of this first standard argue that athletic opportunities
should coincide with a gender's interest in participating in athletics.' 47 Courts
have held that this would go against the goal of remedying the stereotypes of
women and athletics.'48 However, an institution can comply with the third
standard of Title IX by showing that it "demonstrated that the interests and
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and effectively
accommodated by the present program."' 49 The gauge used by opponents of the
first standard for measuring athletic interest is quite different then the gauge and
measurement of athletic interest under the third standard.
Opponents of the first standard want the percentage of the undergraduate
interest of the underrepresented gender to equal the percentage of athletic
opportunities available to the underrepresented gender. The third standard,
however, deals with satisfying all interests of the underrepresented gender. The
Cohen court has read the third standard to require a "relatively simple assessment
of whether there is unmet need in the underrepresented gender that rises to a
level sufficient to warrant a new team or the upgrading of an existing team."' 0
The court states that student plaintiffs, as well as universities, would be required
to assess the interest levels for men and women.' 5' What factors are included in
level of interest? Does that mean that if the person wants to join a team, then the
institution is not meeting the level of interest of that gender's population? Is it
even possible to accurately measure an undergraduate population's interest in
participating in an athletic program? The Department of Education's policy
interpretation is vague in regards to all three standards, but there has been at least
some case law elaboration upon the first standard. Why would an institution risk
not knowing whether it was complying with the third standard, when it could
knowingly comply with the "safe harbor"'52 of the first standard?

143. Id. at 1045-46.
144. Jonah Goldberg, The Trouble with Title IX, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, May 10,

2002.
145. Id.

146. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Cohen I"), aff'd
in part & rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996).

147. Id.
148. Neal v. Bd. of Trs., 198 F.3d 763, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1999).
149. Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1045 (8th Cir. 2002).
150. Cohen 1,991 F.2d at 900.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 897.
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If, at its inception in 1972, Title IX allowed the number of athletic
opportunities to coincide with percentage of the underrepresented gender who
were interested in participating, it is very unlikely that women's athletic
participation would have accelerated at the rate in which it has over the past
thirty years. The percentage of women participating in college athletics has
increased five-fold since Title IX was enacted.' A time has now come, though,
at some institutions where women's participation in intercollegiate athletics has
almost equaled or surpassed their undergraduate enrollment.' 54 Is it possible that
the goals of Title IX can be achieved without eliminating men's programs?
Could it also be possible that men and women, as in almost every facet of life,
do not have the same interest levels in the same subjects? That cannot be known
unless the Department of Education looks to whether analyzing Title IX
compliance can be achieved by looking at a gender's interest and unless it
establishes guidelines for determining that interest. It is possible that the goals
of Title IX can be achieved more efficiently if the law is evaluated and revised.
Title IX has done great things by increasing women's participation in
athletics at all levels, from high school, to college, to professional athletics. Yet,
it has also helped to significantly reduce or eliminate men's participation in
certain sports at all levels, as it did with the wrestling program at the University
of North Dakota. This may result from the vague wording of the 1979
Department of Education policy interpretation. By reviewing this policy
interpretation and reviewing the goals of Title IX in the area of intercollegiate
athletics, it may be possible to expand and encourage the participation of women
in athletics without eliminating men's athletic programs in order to obtain
compliance.
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Chalenor follows the holding of similar cases in sister
circuits. Without revising the current Department of Education policy
interpretation on compliance with Title IX, troubling consequences for both
men's and women's sports could continue to grow. Participation by women in
sports has drastically increased since the passage of Title IX. However, this has
not come without severe cuts in a select group of men's sports, including
wrestling. The way in which the Department of Education has interpreted Title
IX has and will lead to funds designated for women's sports going to areas that

153.

Michael

Dobie,

Title IX

Comes of Age,

June

23,

2002,

http://www.newsday.com.
154. The Chronicle of Higher Education Facts & Figures, Participation:
Proportionof Female Students on Athletic Teams (1999) (on file with author). Georgia

Institute of Technology, of the Atlantic Coast Conference, has a female undergraduate
proportion of twenty-eight percent and a twenty-eight percent proportion of athletic
opportunities for women. The United States Air Force Academy, formerly of the

Western Athletic Conference and now a member of the Mountain West Conference, has
a female undergraduate proportion of sixteen percent and a twenty-six percent proportion
of athletic opportunities for women.
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do not need the funds, just so a university can appear as if it is in compliance
with Title IX. For example, a university may decide to form a women's rowing
team, not because of an interest in rowing, but rather to have thirty more women
participate in sports. Without the interest for rowing, the money could be much
better spent in improving facilities or equipment for women's sports. However,
the use of the funds to make these improvements would notbe taken into account
in determining whether a university complies with the substantial proportionality
prong of Title IX. The Department of Education policy interpretation on Title
IX will continue to prevent universities from using their funds for athletics in the
most efficient way. Therefore, a revision of the Department of Education policy
interpretation is needed.
JEFFREY H. SMITH
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